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nor do they apply to situations governed by the laws of armed conflict. Rather, when states act
outside their own territory in a military context, the relevant law is international humanitarian
law, not human rights law. Dennis contends that states parties to human rights treaties have
never acted as though the provisions of such treaties (including those on derogations) were
applicable to extraterritorial military action, and that in contrast to the lex specialis of international humanitarian law, human rights law does not supply workable and properly tailored
guidance for the conduct of military operations.
Evaluation
The contributors offer divergent points of view on the likely effect of the advisory opinion
on the quest for a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the substantive law on the
several subjects addressed, and the Court's own authority within the UN system and as ajudicial organ. At one end of the spectrum, Falk perceives the ruling as highly significant for efforts
to reorient the peace negotiations within the framework of international law; in light of the
Court's capacity to speak with virtual unanimity, he goes so far as to contend that the formal
view of advisory opinions as technically nonbinding is "outmoded and regressive" and that the
authoritativeness of this ruling should approach that of a binding judgment. For her part,
Pomeranceasserts that a Court bent on aggrandizing its own role beyond consensualjurisdiction
jeopardizes its own authority, which poses a threat to the search for a peaceful settlement.
Throughout the Agora, the contributors bring out ways in which the Court could have done
a much betterjob of discharging its obligations under Articles 53, 56, and 68 of its Statute to
render decisions that are well-founded in fact and law and to state the reasons on which the
advisory opinion was based. Not only those who disagree with the Court's general approach
to the questions addressed (for example, Wedgwood and Murphy on self-defense, and Dennis on
human rights), but even those generally supportive of the decision (for example, Scobbie and
Imseis) question the quality ofjudicial reasoning in aspects of the advisory opinion and offer
alternative explanations (ofthe law of self-defense and humanitarian law, respectively) that are
more precisely reasoned than those stated by the Court. In this vein, Kretzmer asserts that the
Court's failure to articulate the legal reasons underlying its conclusions on humanitarian law
may negatively affect the prospects for compliance.
Our hope is that the reasoned critiques of the advisory opinion expressed in this Agora will
contribute to informed debate on the role of international judicial proceedings, including
advisory proceedings, in an ongoing violent conflict, especially from the perspective of promoting international peace and security, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the authority of
the Court.
THE "WALL" DECISIONS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
By Geoffrey R. Watson*
In June 2002, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to construct a continuous "security fence"
separating much of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River from Israel proper.' The
stated purpose of the barrier was to prevent Palestinian terrorists from entering Israel and
killing Israeli civilians. Construction began in 2002, and a significant portion of the structure
had been completed by early 2004. The current route of the wall deviates significantly from the
"Green Line"-the 1949 armistice line that separates the West Bank from Israel. The fence frequently enters and traverses the West Bank, encirclingJewish settlements there. Eventually, about
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law.
Herb Keinon, Cabinet Okays 'Security Concept, 'JERUSALEM POST [JM. PoST], June 24, 2002, at 1.
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15 percent of the territory of the West Bank, home to several hundred thousand Palestinians,
2
will lie between the wall and the Green Line.
'3
The "fence" or "wall" actually has several components. The centerpiece is the fence or wall
itself. In most places this structure consists of chain-link fencing, but in a few areas it is a concrete wall. The barrier is outfitted with electronic sensors. The complex often includes a fourmeter ditch, a two-lane access road, a strip of sand to detect footprints, and, at the perimeter,
barbed wire.'
The barrier has prompted vigorous protests from the Palestinian Authority and many states
5
around the world. Even Israel's closest ally, the United States, has criticized the project. In October 2003, however, the United States vetoed a draft Security Council resolution condemning
the wall as illegal. 6 On November 19, 2003, the United States and its three partners in the "Quartet"-the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations-sought and obtained Security
Council approval for their "Performance-based Roadmap" for peace in the Middle East, which
7
envisioned interim steps leading to a two-state solution to the conflict. But the road map said
nothing about the wall, and many UN member states pushed for the General Assembly to take
up the matter.
On December 8, 2003, the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly adopted
Resolution ES-10/14, which requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) on the following question:
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by
Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around
EastJerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?
The International Court moved quickly in response to the request. On December 19, the Court
decided, in accordance with Article 66(2) of its Statute, that the United Nations, its member
states, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League would all be "likely
to be able to furnish information" on the question. Moreover, the Court decided that Palestine
should also be entitled to file a written submission, on the grounds that Palestine enjoys special
observer status at the United Nations and that it was a cosponsor of the General Assembly resolution propounding the question.'
The Court received forty-nine written statements, including submissions from Israel, Pales9
tine, the Arab League, and the United States. In these statements, Palestine and most other
participants urged the Court to find that construction of the wall was unlawful. Neither Israel
nor the United States addressed the merits of the question presented, instead urging the ICJ
to exercise its discretion not to issue an advisory opinion. From February 23 to 25, 2004, the
Court also heard oral submissions from representatives of twelve states, the Arab League, the
0
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Palestine.' Again, most of these oral submissions
2 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: THE PLACE OF THE FENCE/WALL IN

Feb. 2004), availableat<http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/engmdel 50162004>.
it is a "fence" or a "barrier,"
' Even the name of the structure is a matter of disagreement. Israel insists that
and indeed in most places its core structure isa chain-link fence, not a solid wall. Palestinians refer to it as a "wall,"
stressing that it is impassable and in a few places quite solid. Greg Myre, Fencing Off: In the Middle East, Even Words
Go to War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, §4, at 3. This essay will use the terms interchangeably.
' Photographs and diagrams of the fence can be found at the Web site of Israel's Ministry of Defense, < http://
www.seamzone.mod.gov.i/Pages/ENG/operational.htm >.
' Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Criticizes Israel'sNew Electronic FenceAlong West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A6.
6 UN Doc. S/PV.4842 (2003); UN Doc. S/2003/980 (draft resolution); see also UN Doc. S/PV.4841 (2003).
7SC Res. 1515 (Nov. 19, 2003).
8Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
paras. 4, 6 (Int'l Ct. Justice July 9, 2004), 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
9Id., para. 9. The written statements are available on the Court's Web site, <http:/www.icj-cij.org>.
10Advisory Opinion, para. 12. The oral submissions are available on the Court's Web site, supra note 9.
INTERNATIONAL LAW (AI Index No. MDE 15/016/2004,
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argued that construction of the wall violated international law. Neither Israel nor the United
States made an oral presentation.
On July 9, 2004, the Court issued an advisory opinion, Legal Consequencesof the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritoy, which described the construction of the wall as a
violation of international law and concluded that states must take steps to avoid supporting
continued construction of the wall. The vote on most subparagraphs of the dispositifwas 14-1.
Sevenjudges contributed separate opinions, but some who voted with the majority nonetheless
expressed misgivings about the Court's reasoning. Judge Thomas Buergenthal cast dissenting
votes on all but one subparagraph of the dispositif.
In the meantime, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court ofJustice, was entertaining several petitions challenging the construction and routing of the wall on various legal
grounds. On June 30, 2004-just nine days before the International Court issued its advisory
opinion-the Supreme Court invalidated military orders for the construction of several portions
of the fence. The Court found that some deviation from the Green Line was acceptable, but that
in many instances the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had routed the wall so as to cause disproportionate harm to the Palestinian population. "
Part I of this essay describes the decision of the International Court, including highlights from
the separate opinions of individual judges. Part II describes the decision of the Israeli Supreme
Court. Part III compares and contrasts the methodology of the two opinions. Part IV offers some
comments on the political and legal context of the decisions.
I. THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE

Jurisdiction
The Court's opinion began by considering Israel's arguments that the ICJ lackedjurisdiction.
The Court first noted that Article 65(1) of its Statute authorizes it to give an advisory opinion on
"any legal question" submitted by a competent authority, and it observed that Article
96(1)
provides that "[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council" may request the Court to give
an advisory opinion on "any legal question." 2
In its written statement, Israel argued that the General Assembly had acted ultra vires the
Charter when it adopted its resolution requesting the advisory opinion. In particular, Israel
contended that the Assembly lacked authority to adopt such a resolution when the Security
Council was already seized of the matter. Israel pointed to Article 12(1) of the UN Charter, which
provides: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."
The Court dismissed this argument on two grounds. First, it asserted that a request for an
advisory opinion is not a recommendation, and thus not prohibited by Article 12(l).13 Second,
the Court said that the Council was not, in any case, "exercising" its "functions" on the matter.
The Court acknowledged that early United Nations practice had held that the Council was
exercising its "functions" if it had a matter on its agenda, but the Court noted that the practice
had evolved to the point where the Assembly is precluded from acting only if the Council is
exercising its functions "at this moment," or at least was exercising them in the recent past. 4
The Court found the modern practice of the Assembly "consistent with" Article 12(1). '" HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel (June 30, 2004), 43 ILM 1099 (2004) [hereinafter Beit
Sourik].
12 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 14-15.
Id., para. 25.
ld., para. 27 (quoting the UN legal counsel, UN Doc. A!C.3/SR. 1637, para. 9 (1968)).
I4
1 Id., para. 28.

'3
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The ICJ also rejected Israel's arguments that the Assembly's request was incompatible with
the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which authorizes the Assembly to make "appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures" when the Council "fails to exercise its primary
6
responsibility" to maintain international peace and security.' The Court observed that a permanent member of the Council (the United States) had vetoed draft resolutions condemning
7
settlements and, in particular, the construction of the wall itself. The Court found it "irrelevant" that the Council had not taken up a resolution specifically considering a request for an
advisory opinion.' Nor did the Court seem to think it relevant that the Security Council had
adopted Resolution 1515, endorsing the Quartet's road map for peace, on November 19, 2003,
just nineteen days before passage of the resolution requesting an advisory opinion on the wall.
The Court likewise dismissed Israel's procedural arguments that the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the Assembly lacked the authority to request the advisory opinion. The Court
found no legal basis for challenging the "rolling" character of the special session, which was
9
initially convened in 1997 and has met eleven times since. Nor did the Court find any "rule
of the Organization" forbidding the special session to meet and conduct business at the same time
2
as the regular session of the General Assembly. " Finally, the Court noted that the special session appeared to have been convened in accordance with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure,
and it saw no reason to rebut the usual presumption that a resolution of a UN organ is valid
2
if adopted in accordance with that organ's procedural rules. '
Next the Court took up Israel's contention that the issue was not a "legal question" within
the meaning of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Court's Statute. Israel contended, among other things, that the question was not phrased with sufficient clarity and specificity and did not lend itself to judicial resolution." Indeed, there were certain ambiguities in
the question posed by the Assembly. For example, it asked what the "legal consequences" of
construction of the wall were, but it did not ask whether construction of the wall itself was unlawful. In addition, the Assembly did not specify whether it meant consequences for all states,
for international organizations, or for Israel and the Palestinians alone.
The Court found that the question presented was "legal." Lack of clarity did not "deprive the
Court ofjurisdiction" but, instead, required "clarification in interpretation" by it. The Court
noted that it had answered ambiguous or unspecific requests on several prior occasions.3 Interpreting the Assembly's request, the Court found that it would indeed be obliged to address the
24
underlying substantive question of the lawfulness of construction of the wall. And it did not find
the task of assessing any resulting "legal consequences" to be unduly abstract or incapable of
determination. 25 Likewise, the Court rejected any suggestion that the question was "political"
rather than "legal." Relying on the advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the Court found that
16GA Res. 377A (V), para. 1 (Nov. 3, 1950).

Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 31.
para. 32.

'8Id.,

1d., para. 33.

Id., para. 34.
" Id., para. 35 (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ REP.
16, 22, para. 20 (June 21)).
22 Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and Propriety 83 (Jan. 30, 2004), Advisory
Opinion, supra note 8 [hereinafter Israel Written Statement].
23Advisory Opinion,supra note 8, para. 38 (citing Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 16(l), at 14-16; Interpretation
of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 ICJ REP. 73, 87-89
(Dec. 20); Application for Review ofJudgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion, 1982 ICJ REP. 325, 348 (July 20); Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South
West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1956 ICJ REP. 23, 25 (June 1); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 ICJ REP. 151, 157-62 (July 20)).
21

24Id.,
15

para. 39.
Id., para. 40.
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the "fact that a legal question also has political aspects" did not mean the question was not a legal
one.2 6 By a unanimous vote, the Court found that it had jurisdiction. 27
Proprietyof ExercisingJurisdiction
The Court next turned to the arguments of Israel and the United States that it should exercise
its discretion not to hear the case. Article 65(1) of the Court's Statute provides that the Court
"may"give an advisory opinion if requested, not "shall" give one. The Court reiterated its traditional position that this language gives it discretion not to give an opinion, but that ordinarily
it should not exercise this discretion without "compelling reasons.""2
Israel and the United States had argued that the Court should exercise its discretion because
an interested party, Israel, had never consented to any adjudication of its dispute with the Palestinians. These states cited the Permanent Court's refusal to issue an advisory opinion in Status
ofEastern Careliabecause Russia, an interested party, had (among other things) refused to consent
to any form of dispute resolution.29 But the International Court found that Eastern Careliawas
not controlling here. The Court distinguished Eastern Careliaon the grounds that it had involved
a state that was not a member of the League of Nations or a party to the Court's Statute. 0
Nor was the Court persuaded by the argument that an advisory opinion might interfere with
the Middle East peace process, in particular the road map to peace sponsored by the Quartet.3'
The Court said it was "not clear.., what influence the Court's opinion might have" on negotiations, and it mentioned that states had conflicting views on this question. Accordingly, it held
that the possibility of interference was not a "compelling reason" to refuse to issue an opinion. 2
The ICJ then turned to the argument that it did not have sufficient facts on which to base a
decision. In its written submission, Israel had asserted that a complete and thorough examination of the question would require a detailed inquiry into the nature of the terrorist threat,
the effectiveness of various alternative routes, the motives behind construction of the fence, the
extent of infringements on Palestinian life and freedom of movement, and a variety of other
complex factual questions.3 3 Even in a contentious proceeding, Israel argued, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a fair inquiry into such highly politicized factual questions.
In this advisory proceeding, Israel noted, participants were given only six weeks in which to file
written materials. Under all these circumstances, Israel argued, the Court "could not possibly
have the necessary material before it" to make "findings of fact. "' Accordingly, Israel observed
that it would not file a submission on the merits in such circumstances. Because Israel chose not
to address the merits, it argued that the Court should follow its precedent in Eastern Carelia, in
which Russia likewise refused to participate in an advisory proceeding. '5
26Id.,
para. 41; see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226,
234, para. 13 (July 8).
27Id., para. 163(1) (dispositij).
28 Id., para. 44 (quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 23, at 155).
29 Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 5, at 27-29 (July 23).
Advisory Opinion, supra note 8,para. 44 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra
note 26, at 235-36, para. 14.
3 See A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
UN Doc. S/253/2003, annex. The road map proposes a three-phase peace process leading to a two-state solution.
The first phase calls for an end to terrorism and the construction of Palestinian civic institutions. The second, transitional phase would include conferences and confidence-building measures, all of which would culminate in the
establishment of a Palestinian state. The third and final phase would lead to a permanent status agreement on issues
such as borders, refugees, settlements, and Jerusalem, as well as a larger peace agreement involving other Arab states,
such as Syria and Lebanon. Although the details and timing of the road map differ from those of the Oslo Accords,
the essential ingredients are similar: interim measures that lead eventually to a permanent status agreement.
32Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 53.
33Israel Written Statement, supra note 22, at 107-10.
34Id. at 110.
35Id.
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The opinion for the Court's majority rejected these arguments. The Court observed that it had
36
in its possession a voluminous report by the secretary-general and detailed submissions from
Palestine and other participants. The Court also noted that while Israel's written statement was
confined tojurisdiction and propriety, it "contained observations on other matters," including
security concerns. The Court added that many other documents relating to Israel's security con'3 7
cerns were already in the "public domain. "Moreover," the Court wrote, "the circumstance that
others may evaluate and interpret these facts in a subjective or political manner can be no argu38
ment for a court of law to abdicate its judicial task."
Next, the Court dismissed the contention that an advisory opinion would serve no useful
purpose. It acknowledged that the General Assembly had already declared the wall illegal and
that the Assembly had not made clear why it wanted an opinion. But the Court invoked its rea39
soning from the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, in which it had rejected a similar argument.
It held that it could not "substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion" for that of the
General Assembly, and40that the Assembly "has not yet determined all the possible consequences
of its own resolution.,
Finally, the Court rejected Israel's argument that an advisory opinion was inappropriate because
of the doctrine nullus commodum capere potest de sua injuriapropria-i.e.,that Palestine came to
the proceedings without "clean hands" insofar as it was responsible for terrorist attacks on
Israeli civilians. The Court quickly dismissed this doctrine as not "pertinent" because the Gen4
eral Assembly, not Palestine, had requested the advisory opinion. " Thus, the Court found, by
42
a vote of 14-1, that there was no "compelling reason" to decline to give an advisory opinion.
4"
Judge Buergenthal, the lone dissenter on this holding, filed a detailed separate opinion. Other
judges, including Judge Hisashi Owada and Judge Rosalyn Higgins, voted with the majority
on this issue but, in separate opinions, expressed qualms about the Court's reasoning."
The Merits
Proceeding to the merits, the International Court first presented a general overview of the
45
facts, beginning with a rather brief history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concluding
46
with a somewhat more detailed description of the wall and its route. The Court then articulated
what it saw as the governing principles of law. It started by invoking the prohibition on the use
of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 47 It then reaffirmed the existence of a right of peoples
48
to self-determination, a right the Court characterized as erga omnes. And the Court found that
49
relevant.
were
law
various norms of international humanitarian
36Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, UN Doc.
A/ES-10/28 (2003) [hereinafter S-G Report] (containing a later Written Statement of the United Nations and
accompanied by a dossier of documents, both available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>).
3' Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 57.
38 Id., para. 58.
31 Id., para. 61 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, at 237, para. 16).
4 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 62.
I' para. 64.
Id.,
443 Id., para. 163(2) (dispositij).
See infra p. 19.
44See infra pp. 16-19. For examinations of the Court's view of its advisory function in the Wall case, see Michla

Pomerance, The ICJ'sAdvisory Jurisdictionand the Crumbling Wall Between the Politicaland the Judicial,99 AJIL 26
(2005) (in this Agora); Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJRuling on Israel's Security Wall, 99 AJIL
42 (2005) (in this Agora).
'5 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 70-78.
46 Id., paras. 79-85.
47 Id.,

para. 87.
48Id., para. 88.
41 Id.,

para. 89.
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The ICJ's discussion of humanitarian law was particularly noteworthy for its treatment of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.5" Israel has long taken the position that the Convention does not
apply dejure to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it has nonetheless voluntarily applied the humanitarian provisions of the Convention de facto. The Palestinians
and most states have long taken the view that the Convention does apply dejure to the Israeli
occupation. Common Article 2 of the Convention provides, in part:
[1] In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.
[2] The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Israel has long argued that the only basis for applying the Convention to an occupation of
territory of a party to the Convention is set forth in paragraph 2, and that paragraph 2 by its
terms limits its applicability to occupation of the territory of a high contracting party. Israel
argues that the West Bank is not such territory, since only two states (Britain and Pakistan) ever
recognized Jordan's assertion of sovereignty over the West Bank, whichJordan held from 1948
to 1967.
The International Court rejected Israel's reading of common Article 2. The Court observed
that paragraph 1 lays down only two conditions for applicability: first, that there be armed conflict; and second, that it take place between two or more contracting parties. If these conditions
are satisfied, the Court said, then "the Convention applies, in particular, in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contracting parties." In other words, the Court
adopted the view that both paragraphs 1 and 2 cover certain instances of occupation of enemy
territory. Paragraph 2, it said, was not intended to limit the scope of paragraph 1by "excluding
therefrom territories not falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting parties." Instead,
paragraph 2 added to, rather than subtracted from, the universe of occupations already covered
by paragraph 1. According to the Court, paragraph 2 merely says that "even if occupation
effected during the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable."'" The
Court found support for its interpretation in the travaux priparatoiresof the Convention, the
practice of the contracting parties after the adoption of the Convention, the practice of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the practice of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court. 52
The Court found one further source of law to be relevant: international human rights law.
Israel has taken the position that the human rights treaties to which it is party, including the Civil
and Political Covenant and the Economic and Social Covenant, are intended to apply only in
time of peace, and that humanitarian law is applicable in time of armed conflict. The Court
noted that it had rejected a similar argument in the Nuclear Weapons advisory proceeding, having dismissed the argument that human rights law applies only in peace. Instead, the Court
reasoned there, the "right to life" norm in human rights law did apply in time of war, but its
content was defined by the overlapping lex specialis-humanitarian law.52 Reiterating this point
in somewhat broader terms, the Wall advisory opinion took the view that "the protection offered
by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict," except insofar as that
protection can be derogated from pursuant to the terms of human rights treaties. 5'
50

Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 UST 3516,
75 UNTS 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
"Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 95.
52Id., paras. 95-100.
53Id., para. 105 (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 26, at 240).
" Id., para. 106.
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The opinion went on to conclude that the Human Rights Covenants apply to the human rights
practices of a state outside its own territory. Article 2(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant
provides that each party "undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its ter5
ritory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights" guaranteed by the Covenant.1 Canvassing the
travauxprparatoiresof the Covenant, and in particular the Human Rights Committee's view that

this provision has extraterritorial effect, the Court concluded that it applied to the conduct of
Israel outside its own territory.5 6 The Economic and Social Covenant does not contain a provision on its territorial scope, but the International Court embraced the view of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that a "State party's obligations under the Covenant
apply to all territories and populations under its effective control."" The Court reached a sims
ilar conclusion about the extraterritorial scope of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
Having determined the applicable law, the Court then sought to apply it to the facts. It first
took note of conflicting views of participants on the purpose and effect of the wall. Palestinians
and many other participants argued that the purpose of the wall was not simply to combat terror,
but also to "create facts" on the ground that would lead to a de facto annexation of a significant
portion of the West Bank. These participants also stressed the deleterious effects of the wall on
Palestinian daily life, the Palestinian economy, and basic liberties like travel and work. By contrast, Israel has argued that the purpose of the wall is solely to prevent terrorist attacks, not to
"create facts"; Israel says the wall will be temporary. In addition, Israel claims that any burden
on Palestinian day-to-day life is far outweighed by the security benefits of the wall, which prevents
suicide bombers and other terrorists from attacking Israeli civilians in Israel and in Israeli settlements on the West Bank.59
The Court then developed an argument that construction of the wall violated Palestinian
rights of self-determination-an argument that Palestine and other participants had pressed in
their written submissions. 60 First citing Security Council Resolution 242, the Court reaffirmed
the general rule against acquisition of territory by force. Citing, next, Israel's recognition of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the "Palestinian people,"
the Court reaffirmed this people's right of self-determination. Finally citing Article 49(6) of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids the occupying power to "deport or transfer parts of
its own civilian population into the territory it occupies," the Court reached the conclusion that
Israeli settlements are unlawful.6 Israel has long argued that "drop by drop" settlement by
individuals is not a state-sponsored "transfer" within the meaning of Article 49(6), but the ICJ
apparently adopted the view that state-sponsored subsidies and incentives are the equivalent of
a "transfer" of the population to those settlements. The Court invoked the practice of the Security Council in support of this conclusion. 62
This holding on settlements led the Court to its conclusions on self-determination. The Court
"note[d] the assurance given by Israel" that the wall would be temporary, but it concluded that
the wall creates "a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent" and lead to de
facto annexation.63 Moreover, the wall was an "expression in loco" of Israel's "illegal" settlement
55International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 2(1), 999 UNTS 331 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
56 Advisory

Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 109-11.

5'Id., para. 112 (quoting Concluding Observations: Israel, UN Doc. E/C. 12/l/Add.90, paras. 15, 31 (2003),

availableat <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>). For the Covenant, see International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESC].
5
Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 113. For the Convention, see Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.
39Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 115-16.

60See, e.g., Written Statement Submitted by Palestine 305-06 (Jan. 30, 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra note 8;
Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan 126-30 (Jan. 30,2004), Advisory Opinion,
supra; Written Statement of the League of Arab States 62-65 (Jan. 2004), Advisory Opinion, supra.
6IAdvisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 117-20.
62 Id., para. 120.
61Id.,
para. 121.
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policy, one that posed a "risk of further alterations to the demographic composition" of the West
Bank because of the possible Palestinian "departure" from affected areas. The Court concluded
that construction of the wall "severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right
to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right."'
The majority opinion next turned to humanitarian law and human rights law. It first noted
that Article 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that certain provisions of the Convention
remain applicable "for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises
the functions of government in such territory." These provisions include Article 49 (prohibiting
deportations from occupied territory, and transfer of the occupier's civilian population into
it), Article 53 (restricting the destruction of private property), and Article 59 (obliging the

occupier to permit relief supplies to flow into occupied territory). 65 The Court likewise noted
that some provisions of human rights law are applicable to the occupation, and it observed that
Israel had exercised its right of derogation only from Article 9 of the Civil and Political Covenant, relating to liberty and security of person, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention.66 In
particular, the Court emphasized the applicability of Article 17(1) of the Covenant, which for-

bids "arbitrary or unlawful interference" with "privacy, family, home or correspondence," and
Article 12, which protects freedom of movement.67 Various provisions of the Economic and Social
Covenant were also deemed pertinent, including Articles 6 and 7, which guarantee the right to
work, and the protections relating to food, hunger, children, health, and education in Articles
10 through 14.68 The Court reached similar conclusions regarding various provisions of the

Convention on the Rights of the Child.6 9
Interestingly, the Court also found relevant several instruments obliging Israel to afford free
access to holy places. The Court indicated that access to the holy places had been guaranteed in

the British Mandate for Palestine and in the 1947 UN General Assembly Plan of Partition for
Palestine. 76 And it found that Israel remained bound by undertakings in its 1949 General Armistice Agreement with Jordan, which obliged the parties to establish ajoint committee to deal with
matters on which "agreement in principle already exists," including "free access" to the holy
places. 7' The Court considered that this obligation had "further been confirmed" by Article 9(1)
of the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, which provides in general terms that each
party will provide "freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance."72 The

Court's reliance on these materials was surprising, given that neither Palestine norJordan had
73

emphasized the holy places in its written statement.
The Court next found that Israel had violated various provisions of humanitarian law relating
to economic and social rights." Citing a report of the secretary-general, the Court stated that
the wall had imposed substantial restrictions on the movement of Palestinians (but not of Israeli

citizens), and that it had had serious deleterious effects on the agriculture, education, health
' Id., para. 122.
65 Id.,

para. 126; see Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 50, Arts. 6(3), 49, 53, 59.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 127.
67Id., para. 128; see ICCPR, supra note 55, Arts. 17(1), 12.
66

68Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 130; see ICESC, supra note 57, Arts. 6, 7, 10-14.
69

Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 131.
para. 129.

70 Id.,

7 General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Isr.-Jordan, Art. VIII(2), availableat <http://www.yale.edulawweb/
avalon/mideast/arm03.htm >.
72 Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, Art. 9(1), 34 ILM 43 (1995), quoted in Advisory Opinion, supra
note 8, para. 129.
73
See Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, supranote 60, at 302-07 (summarizing Palestine's legal argument); Written Statement Submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan, supra note 60, at 152-55 (summary
ofJordan's argument); see also Written Statement of the League of Arab States, supra note 60, at 62-103 (emphasizing self-determination, humanitarian law, and human rights law but not instruments relating to the holy places).
7'Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 132 (citing Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Arts. 46, 52, annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, Art. 53).
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care, and overall economy of Palestine.75 The Court acknowledged that Israel had provided access
gates along the wall, but they were "few in number in certain sectors and opening hours appear
to be restricted and unpredictably applied." In this connection, the ICJ suggested that the wall
"is tending to alter the demographic composition" of the West Bank, contributing7 6to what the
Convention.
Court described as a violation of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva
Acknowledging that some provisions of humanitarian law permit an occupier to take certain
security measures when militarily necessary, the Court still noted that other provisions contained
no such exception. For example, no exception for military necessity could be found in Article 49(6)
of the Fourth Geneva Convention (restricting transfers of population into occupied territory)
or Article 46 of the Hague Regulations (obliging respect for, and prohibiting confiscation of,
private property). On the other hand, the Court conceded that Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which prohibits deportations and mass transfers of population from occupied territory, is qualified by Article 49(2), which permits "evacuation" if the "security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand." Likewise, the Court acknowledged that Article 53
of the Convention prohibits destruction of private property except "where such destruction is
77
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations., But the Court concluded simply that
"on the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary
to the prohibition in Article 53 of78the Fourth Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely
necessary by military operations."
The Court quickly rejected Israel's self-defense arguments, observing that Article 51 of the
Charter covers attacks "by one State against another State" and that Israel was not claiming that
terror attacks against it were "imputable to a foreign State." In addition, Israel "exercises control"
over the West Bank, and the terrorist threat "originates within, and not outside, that territory."
The situation was thus "different" from those elaborated in Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373, which reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defense in the context of international
terrorism. Therefore, the Court concluded, Article 51 of the Charter had "no relevance" to the
current case.79
Finally, the Court held that Israel could notjustify the wall on grounds of necessity. According
to Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, an act can be justified on grounds of necessity if it is "the only way for
'8
the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. After quoting
this provision, the Court said simply that it was "not convinced" that the wall was "the only
means" for Israel to combat the terrorist threat. 8
Thus, by a 14-1 vote, the Court concluded that construction of the wall was "contrary to international law."8 2 The applicable portion of the dispositif, paragraph 3(A), was not broken down
in any more detail. As we shall see, at least one or two judges voted for this subparagraph of the
dispositif despite not agreeing with all the analysis supporting it.
The Court next turned to the legal consequences of this violation. Beginning with consequences
for Israel, the Court said that Israel had a duty to cease construction of the wall and dismantle
those parts of it that extend past the Green Line into the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Invoking Chorz6w Factory, the Court added that Israel was obliged "to make reparation
'3Id., paras. 132-33 (citing S-G Report, supranote 36).
76ld., para. 133.
77Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 50, Arts. 49, 53.
7
8Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 135.
791d., para. 139.
80
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its First-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, Art. 25, UN Doc. A/56/10
(2001), reprintedinJAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION'sARTIcLEs ON STATE REsPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

(2002).

"' Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 140.
82Id., para. 163(3)(A) (dispositi).Again, Judge Buergenthal's was the sole dissenting vote. See infra p. 19.
8'Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, paras. 149-5 1.
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for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned."84 This obligation entailed
restitution of private property or, if that was impossible, compensation.15 These conclusions garnered 14 votes, with Judge Buergenthal again alone in dissent. 86
The Court next articulated various legal consequences for other states and international organizations. Citing Barcelona Traction, the Court ruled that Israel had violated some obligations
erga omnes, such as those respecting Palestinian self-determination and certain provisions of
humanitarian law. 7 The majority also took the view that common Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which obliges states to "respect and ensure respect for" the Convention, meant that
every state party was obliged "to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are
complied with."88 Consequently, states are bound "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall" and "not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the
situation created by such construction." 9 The vote on this particular holding was 13-2, withJudge
KooijmansjoiningJudge Buergenthal in dissent."0 Lastly, "the United Nations, and especially
the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required
to bring to an end the illegal situation" brought about by construction of the wall. 91
The Court ended its opinion with some broader thoughts on the Middle East peace process.
"Illegal actions," it said, had been taken by "all sides" of the conflict, and both Israel and Palestine were obliged to respect humanitarian law. It called for a peaceful, negotiated solution to
the conflict in accordance with Security Council resolutions, it noted that the road map is the most
recent diplomatic effort to achieve such a solution, and it encouraged the General Assemblythe addressee of the advisory opinion-to take action to facilitate such a solution.92
The Separate Opinions

Seven judges filed separate opinions. Judge Abdul Koroma stated that construction of the
wall "has involved the annexation" of parts of the West Bank.93 He endorsed all the Court's holdings and emphasized what he saw as the particular importance of those on self-determination,
humanitarian law, and obligations erga omnes. 94 judge Awn Al-Khasawneh stressed the importance of the Court's holding on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but he expressed less enthusiasm for the Court's repeated references to the road map. While he found
"nothing wrong" with endorsing negotiated settlement, Judge A1-Khasawneh said that negotiations were a "means to an end" rather than an end in and of themselves, and he expressed doubt
9
about the viability of the road map. 5
Judge Nabil Elaraby also praised the advisory opinion, in particular its conclusions on humanitarian law and the role of the United Nations, but he maintained that the dispositif should
have contained some reference to the Court's condemnation of de facto annexation. 96 He also
adverted to Israel's unsuccessful motion to disqualify him because of statements he had made
before he joined the Court. He insisted that he had been guided by Judge Manfred Lachs's "wise
84Id., para. 152 (citing Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)).
85

ld., para. 153.

86 Id., para. 163(3)(B), (C) (dispositif).
87 Id.,

para. 154 (citing Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 ICJ REP. 5,

32, para. 33 (Feb. 5)).
88
Id., para. 158.
89
Id., para. 159.

90 Id., para. 163(3)(D) (dispositif).
8 Id., para. 160.
92 Id., para. 162.
93Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 43 ILM at 1056, para. 2.

9

Id., paras. 5- 10.
96Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of judge A-Khasawneh, 43 ILM at 1075, para. 13.
96 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate

Opinion of judge Elaraby, 43 ILM at 1081, para. 2.5.
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maxim," in his separate opinion in the Nicaragua Judgment, that ajudge should be "impartial,
objective, detached, disinterested and unbiased."97
Judge Owada, also writing separately, suggested that the Court's treatment of the justiciability
question was not sufficiently nuanced. Judge Owada agreed that EasternCareliawas distinguishable because Russia had not been a member of the League of Nations, and he stressed that the
Permanent Court had found it "unnecessary" to decide more generally whether the absence of
consent should preclude an advisory proceeding when there was an ongoing bilateral dispute. 9
But he thought that Israel's refusal to consent should at least be a "factor" in deciding whether
to issue an advisory opinion, and he expressed concern that the Court had relied too heavily on
the Namibia advisory opinion as precedent-a case in which the consequences of the act of a
UN organ were at issue.99 Likewise, Judge Owada observed that Israel's nonparticipation imposed an obligation on the Court to be scrupulously fair. In that connection, Israel would have
been justified in seeking ajudge ad hoc for the proceedings;l00 furthermore, the available evidence was "wanting" as to the "Israeli side of the picture."'0 ' More generally, Judge Owada em"violence perpetrated by both sides
phasized the need to recall the broader context, including
02
against innocent civilian population of each other." 1
Judge Higgins similarly found the question of propriety less "straightforward" than the
Court's majority, though (like Judge Owada) she ultimately voted with the majority. Also like
Judge Owada, she quoted the Western Saharaadvisory opinion, which maintained that "lack of
consent of an interested State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with
the Court's judicial character' ', 0 3 In Western Sahara, the Court had emphasized that it was not
issuing an opinion "in order that [the General Assembly] may later, on the basis of the Court's
opinion, exercise its powers and functions" but, instead, to assist the Assembly in carrying out its
duties with respect to decolonization. "°In the Wall case, Judge Higgins wrote, "it is the reverse
circumstance that obtains," a point on which she found the Court's majority "strikingly silent." 0 5
EchoingJudge Owada, Judge Higgins emphasized the need to consider the dispute in a broader
context. The Court's treatment of the history of the Arab-Israeli dispute was "neither balanced
nor satisfactory." 0 6 According to Judge Higgins, the Court should have "spelled out what is
required of both parties," using Resolution 242 as a frame of reference. She added that the dispositifshould have included some reference to the parties' mutual obligations to move forward
simultaneously on a peaceful resolution of their dispute. 0
Judge Higgins voted for paragraph 3(A) of the dispositif-the general finding that Israel had
violated international law-but she was critical of much of the Court's analysis supporting that
conclusion. She found the Court's treatment of humanitarian law "somewhat light," and she
chided the Court for not indicating more clearly which provisions of humanitarian law Israel had
violated, and which it had not. In fact, she read the opinion as finding that Israel had violated
only Articles 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague
" See id., 2d para. (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 ICJ REP. 14, 158 (June 27) (Lachs,J., sep. op.)); see also Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, para. 8; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Order (Int'l Ct. Justice Jan. 30,
2004) (rejecting Israel's motion by a vote of 14-1); id., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Buergenthal.
" Advisory Opinion, supranote 8, Separate Opinion ofJudge Owada, 43 ILM at 1091, para. 7 (quoting Status
of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 5, at 27 (July 23)).
99Id., paras. 10-11.

"°°Id., para. 19.
'o1Id., para. 22.
1021d.,
para. 31.
"'Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, 43 ILM at 1058, para. 10 (quoting
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ REP. 12, 25, paras. 32-33 (Oct. 16)).
104Id., para. 12 (quoting Western Sahara, supra note 103, at 26-27, para. 39).
5
11Id., paras. 12,
106Id., para. 16.

107
Id., para. 18.
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Regulations.°' As to the Human Rights Covenants, Judge Higgins wondered whether it was
appropriate for the Assembly to seek an advisory opinion when a committee for each Covenant
already monitors compliance in detail. She added: "[W]hile many, many States are not in compliance with their obligations under the two Covenants, the Court is being asked to look only
at the conduct of Israel in this regard."'0°Judge Higgins also criticized the Court's holding that
the wall violates Palestinian rights of self-determination. She accepted the existence of a postcolonial right of self-determination, "[b]ut it seems... quite detached fiom reality for the Court
to find that it is the wall that presents a 'serious impediment' to the exercise of this right." 110
Judge Higgins further found fault with much of the Court's self-defense analysis, reiterating
her view that Article 51 does not in itself require an armed attack by a "state." In any case, she
disputed the Court's conclusion that an attack originating in the West Bank could not be an
armed attack by a "state.""111
Judge Higgins voted for the remaining portions of the dispositif,but she again expressed
reservations about the supporting analysis. She concurred with the Court's holding that states
had a duty not to recognize or support the resulting illegal situation, but she saw no need to
invoke the concept of obligations erga omnes in support of this conclusion. 112 She, too, expressed
reservations about the availability of evidence reflecting the Israeli perspective. 13
Judge Kooijmans also expressed some reservations about the Court's analysis, and on one
issue-the legal consequences for states-he cast a dissenting vote. Like Judges Higgins and
Owada, he thought the question should have been dealt with in a broader context, taking account
of legal obligations on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." 4 He concurred with the
Court that the request for the advisory opinion was valid, but he believed that the General Assembly would have been barred from making its request "if the Security Council had been considering the specific issue of the construction of the wall without yet having taken a decision."15
Judge Kooijmans felt "considerable hesitation" about the propriety of giving an opinion, partly
out of fear of "politicization" of the Court, and partly because he did not fully understand how
the General Assembly intended to use the opinion in its work."' On the merits, Judge Kooijmans
shared some of Judge Higgins's doubts about the applicability of the right of self-determination. 17 He also said that Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 had broadened the notion
of self-defense so as to include "international terrorism" not necessarily attributable to a particular state, and he chided the Court for having "bypassed" this wrinkle on self-defense law. None8
theless, he did not see terror attacks emanating from occupied territory as "international.""1
Judge Kooijmans did, however, dissent from the Court's holding in paragraph 3(D) of the
dispositifthatall states are under a duty not to "recognize the illegal situation" created by the wall,
and that states party to the Fourth Geneva Convention have a further duty to "ensure compliance by Israel" with that Convention. Judge Kooijmans had no problem with a duty not to recognize an illegal "promulgation," such as the annexation of Manchuria by Japan, but he found
it meaningless to speak of an obligation not to recognize an "illegal fact." ' 19 As to the Fourth
Geneva Convention, he cited one recent study of the travaux prdparatoiressuggesting that the
ensure respect" language was "mainly intended to ensure respect of the conventions by the
08

Id., paras. 24, 25.
Id.,
para. 27.
0
Id., para. 30.
1Id., paras. 33, 34.
2
" Id., paras. 37-39.
"3 Id., para. 40.
15 Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 43 ILM at 1065, paras. 3-13.
1 Id., para. 18.
6
11
Id., paras. 14-28.
7
" Id., paras. 31-33.
8
" Id., paras. 35-36.
"9Id., paras. 43-44.
'
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population as a whole." 2 " While Judge Kooijmans did not necessarily support as restrictive a
reading as might have originally prevailed in 1949, he was nonetheless uncertain about both
the correctness of the Court's holding as a statement of "positive law," and what the obligation
would entail other than "diplomatic demarches" to Israel. 12,
Judge Buergenthal voted against every subparagraph of the dispositifexcept the finding that
the Court had jurisdiction. His dissenting votes did not mean he disagreed with everything the
Court said; in fact, he found "much in the Opinion with which I agree." Instead, his votes reflected his view that the Court should have exercised its discretion not to issue an opinion because
it lacked the factual record necessary to reach an informed conclusion. 122 In his view, the "nature"
and "impact" of cross-Green Line terror attacks were "never really seriously examined by the
Court." Had the majority considered Israel's justifications for the wall more carefully, Judge
Buergenthal said, "that would have given the Opinion the credibility I believe it lacks." 123
Judge Buergenthal also criticized the Court for so quickly dismissing Israel's self-defense
arguments. Like some of the concurringjudges, Judge Buergenthal noted that Article 51 is not
by its terms limited to state-sponsored "armed attack," and he stressed the broad wording of the
Security Council's recent resolutions on terrorism. He therefore took the view that an attack
emanating from the West Bank across the Green Line did implicate Article 51, and he faulted the
Court for having failed to analyze whether the wall was a necessary and proportionate response
to the terror threat. 124
More generally, Judge Buergenthal expressed dismay over what he saw as the conclusory
nature of much of the Court's analysis. He chided the Court for asserting without explanation
that it was "not convinced" that the "military necessity" exceptions in humanitarian law were
applicable. 25 Finally, he stressed that Israel had no legal obligation to participate in the proceedings, and that the Court was bound not to draw any "adverse evidentiary conclusions" from
Israel's failure to appear. 121
I.

THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT DECISION

In early 2004, residents of various villages northwest of Jerusalem filed petitions with the
Israeli Supreme Court seeking to invalidate military orders for the construction of portions of
the fence.' 7 The petitions alleged that the orders violated Israeli administrative law and public
international law.' 2 Interestingly, some Jewish residents of the Israeli town Mevasseret Zion joined
in the Palestinian petition, though others opposed it. 129 The Supreme Court, sitting as the High
Court ofJustice,'30 temporarily enjoined construction while it considered the petitions.'' On
June 30, 2004-just nine days before the ICJ issued its advisory opinion-the High Court of
Justice handed down its opinion in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel,which invalidated orders
for the construction of several parts of the fence and instructed the IDF to reroute the wall so
as to decrease its negative impact on daily Palestinian life.
120Id.,
para.

47 (citing Frits Kalshoven, The Undertakingto Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances:From

Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 1999 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3).

Id., para. 50.

121

122Advisory

Opinion, supra note 8, Declaration ofJudge Buergenthal, 43 ILM at 1078, para. 1.

Id., para. 3.
124Id., paras. 4-6.
15 Id., paras. 7-9.
123

26

1

Id., para. 10.

127 Etgar

Lefkovits & Yaakov Katz, Court Stops Work on Partof Barrier,JM. POST, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1.
Sourik, supra note 11, para. 9.
29
1 Id., para. 22.
130Israeli law authorizes the Supreme Court to sit as a High Court of Justice in the first instance on certain
questions of administrative and constitutional law. BASIC LAW: Judiciary § 15(c), (d) (Isr.).
13'
Beit Sourik, supra note 11, para. 16.
128Beit
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President Aharon Barak, writing for a unanimous three-justice panel, began by announcing
what law applied. He reiterated the Supreme Court's longstanding view that the Hague Regulations apply and are enforceable in Israeli courts because they are customary international law,
which is part of Israeli law. As for the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court assumed, without
deciding, that it was applicable because "the parties agree that the humanitarian rules of the
Fourth Geneva Convention apply to the issue under review." 13
Justice Barak then considered whether the military commander had the authority to erect the
fence. In particular, the Court considered whether the fence was motivated by "security" concerns, which could be a valid purpose, or by "political" desires to annex territory, which could
not. The Israeli government pointed to its repeated assertions that the purpose of the wall was
to fight terror, that it was temporary, that it could be moved, and that it was not intended to
establish borders. Affidavits from IDF personnel made similar points. "' In response, Palestinian villagers argued that the wall effected a creeping annexation. Had the purpose been purely
military, they argued, the fence would have followed the Green Line. 134 But the Court drew the
opposite inference: security considerations would be more (not less) likely to require deviation
from the Green Line. The Court also noted that the IDF had agreed to move the wall several
times over the course of seven judicial hearings on the matter, further indicating that the purpose was related to security. The Court concluded that the purpose of the wall was to promote
security. 135
The Court also found that the IDF had the authority to seize private property in order to
construct the fence. It noted that humanitarian law permits such seizures for military purposes,
provided that compensation is paid. In the Court's view, the crucial question became whether
the route of the fence was justified by military necessity.116 It was on this question-whether the
route struck an acceptable balance between security and humanitarian concerns-that the
Court focused most of its attention.
Justice Barak began his exploration of that question by discussing, at considerable length, the
content of the requirement of proportionality. 137 He concluded that proportionality required
(1) a reasonable relationship between means and ends, (2) a showing that there were no less
restrictive alternatives that achieved the same security aims, and (3) a showing that the increased
security derived from a given routing decision was proportionate to the corresponding increased
harm to civilians. 138 He then proceeded to apply this test to a series of individual military orders,
each concerning a particular portion of the wall.
In each case, the Court found that the fence satisfied the first test-whether there was a reasonable fit between the means (the fence) and the ends (security). The Court had before it conflicting military opinions on this question; some members of the Council of Peace and Security
(a group of retired Israeli military officials) argued that the wall was not reasonably related to
its goal, protecting security. The IDF, of course, took the opposite view.' 39 In resolving this
conflict, Justice Barak enunciated a moderately deferential standard of review: "whether a reasonable military commander would have set out the route as this military commander did."'4 °
The Court found that the overall decision to place the fence, as well as the specific routes in
question, passed this test."'
3
' ' Id., para. 23; cf HCJ 4764/04, Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander of IDF Forces, para. 19 (May 30,
2004) (holding that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to IDF military operations in the Gaza Strip).
133Beit Sourik, supra note 11, paras. 28-29.
3
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Likewise, the Court found that each portion of the fence at issue satisfied the second prong
of his three-part test: was there a less restrictive route that achieved the exact same security benefit? Again, the Court had before it conflicting testimony from current and former Israeli military officers. And again, the Court deferred to the expertise of the current military officials, holding that it would not "intervene" in the exercise of their discretion. 142
In several instances, however, the Court found that sections of the fence violated the third
prong of the test-the requirement of a balance between security benefits and harm to the civilian population. One ten-kilometer segment, for example, was routed so as to preserve Israeli
military control of the strategic mountainous area ofJebel Muktam, which dominates the highway from Jerusalem to Modi'in. The Court indicated that this route separated thirteen thousand farmers from their land, and that access gates would result in long lines and require
farmers to take circuitous routes to reach their land. 4 3 Noting that the Council for Peace and
Security had proposed an alternative, the Court ordered the IDF to find a different route.
"Such an alternate route exists. It is not a figment of the imagination. It was presented before
us. It is based on military control ofJebel Muktam ....," The Court made similar findings
as to another four-and-a-half kilometer segment of the wall, this one between the villages of
Katane and Har Adar; it again stressed the damage to the livelihood of farmers.'45 Likewise,
a five-and-a-half kilometer segment near Beit Sourik had to be rerouted, as the "way of life"
of the inhabitants had been "completely undermined." 46
1 Yet another five-kilometer section,
this one near Bidu and Beit Daku, had to be altered. "'
The Court then stepped back to assess all of the wall segments at issue, totaling some forty
kilometers in length. It had asked the government about compensating farmers with land
instead of cash but said it "did not receive a satisfactory answer." The government was obliged
to try to find new land for these farmers. "Monetary
compensation," the Court held, "may only
48
be offered if there are no substitute lands." 1
Finally, President Barak reflected on the tension between the war on terror and democratic
ideals. He quoted his own opinion in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel: "A democracy must sometimes fight with one arm tied behind her back." 4 9 He added: "Only a separation
fence built on a base of law will grant security to the state and its citizens. Only a separation
route based on the path of law, will lead the state to the security so yearned for." 150
III.

THE DECISIONS IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

The Wall advisory opinion and the Beit Sourik decision share a few characteristics, but on the
whole they reflect fundamentally different judicial approaches to the problem of the security
fence. Of course, some of these differences derive from the different procedural postures of the
cases and from the very different characteristics of the courts in question. But most of the differences are deeper. In this part, I briefly assess the commonalities between the opinions, then
the differences. In part IV, I then offer some concluding thoughts on the broader political and
legal context.
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Id., paras. 58, 70, 75.
para. 60.

143Id.,
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Id., para. 61.

Id., para. 67 (holding that the parties "must continue to discuss this issue" with a view to a negotiated
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change in route).
146Id., paras. 70-71 (annulling the corresponding military order).
147Id.,

para. 80.
Id., paras. 82-83.
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Id., para. 86 (quoting HCJ 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845 (Sept. 6,
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1999)).
150Id.
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Commonalities
The ICJ and the Israeli Supreme Court agreed on a few substantive issues. For starters, each
court applied the Fourth Geneva Convention to the fence dispute, notwithstanding Israel's
longstanding position that the Convention does not apply dejure to Israel's occupation of the
West Bank. Admittedly, the Supreme Court did so only because the parties did not make it an
issue, a tack the Court has followed in the past. But the bottom line is welcome: as I have argued
elsewhere, the better view is that the Convention is applicable. 151
That said, the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence on the Fourth Geneva Convention is somewhat
puzzling. A court might readily accept the parties' stipulations on facts, but should a court always
defer to the parties' agreement on what law should apply? If in fact the Convention was not
applicable, one might think it would be the duty of the Israeli Supreme Court to "say what the
law is."' 152 One hopes the Court will have more to say not only on whether the Convention
applies to the Israeli occupation but also on the extent to which it is directly binding in Israel
as customary international law. ' 5 3 Nevertheless, the Court's application of the Convention in
cases like Beit Sourik is certainly an auspicious development. Likewise, it is helpful to have an
authoritative statement on the same point from the International Court of Justice.
Of course, the ICJ and the Israeli Court agreed on more than just the applicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention. Each tribunal found that the "security fence" to some extent violates humanitarian law, insofar as it disrupts the daily life and livelihood of the civilian Palestinian population. Obviously, the International Court's holding was far more sweeping than the
Israeli Court's limited holding, while the Israeli Court's methodology was more meticulous,
both in enunciating the law and in applying it to the facts in a particularized fashion. Nevertheless, the core of the analysis was the same: to at least some extent, the wall strikes an inappropriate balance between security and humanitarian concerns.
The two opinions share one other feature. Neither found it necessary to advert to the legal
framework constructed by the Israelis and Palestinians themselves-the Oslo Accords and earlier instruments, such as the Camp David Accords. This methodology may reflect an assumption that the Oslo Accords were never legally binding-or, perhaps, an assumption that they
are legally, and not just politically, dead.
Such assumptions are misplaced. The accords were intended to be legally binding. They
speak of "enter[ing] into force."' 54 They use language of obligation, such as "shall" and "will."
They are characterized by a high degree of legal formality: they are in writing, they were signed
at treatylike ceremonies, and they were executed by the highest representatives of the parties.
They may not be agreements "between states," as envisioned by Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,' 55 but they are agreements between a state and the PLO, 156 which
might well be considered a "subject of international law" that can be bound by an international
'5' On the Court's past practice, see, for example, HCJ 5591/02, Yassin v. Commander of Kziot Military Camp,
para. 12 (Dec. 18, 2002) (finding the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable because "Israel sees itself as bound by
the humanitarian provisions of the convention"); HCJ 3278/02, Centerfor Defense ofIndividual v. IDF Commander,
para. 23 (Dec. 18, 2002) (similar). My argument can be found in GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO AccoRDs 136-42
(2000).
112Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
153Customary international law has the force of law in Israeli courts, whereas conventional law must be incorporated into domestic law by implementing legislation. See generally Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the
Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. REV. 451 (1990).
'54See, e.g., Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO,
Art. XVII(1), 32 ILM 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]; Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 ILM 551 (1997) [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
L Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, Art. 2(1)(a), 1155 UNTS 331.
The PLO signed the accords, not the Palestinian Authority. The accords recognized the PLO as having some
competence to sign international agreements "for the benefit" of the PA, whereas the PA's competence was restricted to domestic matters. Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Art. IX(5). Apparently, this arrangement was
intended to allay Israeli concerns that a unified PLO/PA might be regarded as a state. But there is no evidence
that this configuration was intended to relieve the accords of binding force.
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agreement. Article 3(a) of the Vienna Convention provides that it does not affect the "legal
force" of agreements involving "subjects of international law," and some state practice, mostly
involving decolonization agreements, suggests that states have treated agreements with substate
entities as legally binding.'57 The Israeli-Palestinian dispute may not involve decolonization in
the traditional sense, but it is plainly analogous. Palestine appears to be a state instatu nascendi.

It enjoys observer status at the United Nations; the PLO has attempted to accede to the Geneva
Conventions; Palestine was permitted to make written and oral submissions before the ICJ in
the Wall case; it has embassies around the world; and dozens of states recognize it. In the view
of some judges of the ICJ, the Court should have reminded Palestine (and not just Israel) of
its obligations to respect humanitarian law. If such obligations exist, then surely bilateral treaty
obligations can, too.
Even if the PLO or Palestine is not a subject of international law, the accords might still be
seen as binding declarations made by a state (Israel) in good faith, in the manner of Nuclear
Tests.' 5 s Or, as Israel's former legal adviser Robbie Sabel suggests, one might construct "a legal
theory whereby a state would be under a legal obligation to comply with undertakings made to
a substate entity-the obligation being unilateral but conditional on the compliance by the substate entity with its commitments as defined by the agreement." 159
If the Oslo Accords were binding when entered into, they are still, generally speaking, in force
today. It may well be that Oslo is politically dead, as Ariel Sharon and countless other politicians and pundits like to say. But that does not mean they are dead legally. Yes, there have been
material breaches of the accords, but international agreements do not terminate automatically
upon breach, even material breach, by one party or the other; one party must invoke the other's
breach as a basis for termination. 60
' In this case, neither party has formally invoked breach by
the other as a basis for termination. Prime Minister Sharon has pronounced them "dead," but
his government has not formally declared them no longer in force. In fact, Israel has continued
to abide by several of its central obligations under Oslo. It continues to recognize the Palestinian
Authority. It has, from time to time, continued to transfer tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority, " as required by the Interim Agreement.' 62 It continues to favor a negotiated peace along the
general lines envisioned by the accords. Israeli law still implements the Oslo Accords, and that
implementing legislation has not been repealed. The Palestinians, for their part, continue to
recognize Israel and continue to operate their Palestinian Authority within the framework
envisioned by Oslo, although they still have not held new elections for the Palestinian Legis6
lative Council. 3

It is also not plausible to suggest that the Oslo Accords have terminated simply because of
the passage of time. To be sure, they describe themselves as "interim" agreements that were
intended to lead to a permanent status agreement. They originally envisioned a five-year interim period ending on May 4, 1999, but did not provide that they would terminate automatically
if success was not achieved by that date. In fact, the agreements contain no termination clauses
at all. As the May 4 deadline approached, Yasir Arafat initially threatened to declare Palestinian statehood unilaterally, " but he was persuaded not to do so, and the parties appear to have
tacitly agreed to keep the agreements in force after May 4, 1999. That date came and went
'5'For

a fuller discussion of this practice, see WATSON, supra note 151, at 91-99.
158
Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253 (Dec. 20).
'59 Robbie Sabel, Book Review, 95 AJIL 248, 250-51 (2001) (reviewing WATSON, supra note 151).
16 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 155, Art. 60(1).
161See, e.g., Herb Keinon, US Envoy Talks to Focus on Outposts,JM. PosT,July 13, 2004, at 2 (reporting on Israeli
commitments to return tax revenue to the PA); Herb Keinon, Israel to Transfer Additional NIS 130m. in Taxes to PA,
JM. POST, Jan. 2, 2003, at 1.
162 Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Annex V, app. 1,Art. V(4)(a), (b).
163 Cf.Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, supra note 60, at 49 (asserting that elections have not been
held because of the "prevailing coercive situation" in the occupied territories).
6
' ' See Mohammed Najib et al., PalestiniansReaffirm Planto Declare Statehood at the UN,JM. POST, Sept. 25, 1998, at 2.
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without much fanfare, 6 5 and four months66 later the parties reaffirmed their Oslo commitments
in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.1
In any case, neither the ICJ nor the Israeli Supreme Court relied to any significant extent on
the Oslo Accords, not even as guides to interpretation of other instruments. This methodology
is perhaps understandable in the case of the Israeli Court, which is part of a legal system that,
like many others, maintains that some obligations are binding only on the international plane.
But it is less understandable in the case of the ICJ, which went to great lengths to rely on legal
sources that seem further removed from the Wall controversy than the Oslo Accords-instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Economic and Social Covenant. 6 7After all, if the accords are binding, then they have much to say about the fence case.
The Interim Agreement forbids both parties to "change the status" of the West Bank pending
the outcome of permanent status negotiations.' 6 Settlements, borders, and Jerusalem are all
reserved as "permanent status issues," to be settled by negotiation. 66 The Palestinians are
obliged to combat terrorism and cease supporting it; in exchange, Israel is obliged to redeploy
from the West Bank. 170 These obligations all seem highly relevant to the "legal consequences"
of construction of the wall.
Differences
The differences between the opinions outweigh the similarities. The International Court
adopted a broad, sweeping holding that every inch of the fence violates international law. The
Israeli Court found that many, but not all, segments of a portion of the wall violate international law. The ICJ applied a wide range of legal sources, including humanitarian law, the two
Human Rights Covenants, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the right of self-determination. The Supreme Court focused narrowly on humanitarian law and Israeli administrative
law. Again, some of these differences stem from the different characteristics of the two tribunals
and the differing procedural posture. But they also reflect deeper differences on questions of
methodology and substance.
The Israeli Court employed a meticulous and particularized methodology that seems more
satisfying than the generalized approach of the International Court, even allowing for the fact
that the latter court was ruling in an advisory capacity. In ascertaining and applying the law, the
International Court spoke in conclusory terms, whereas the Israeli Court engaged in a much
fuller (though sometimes also conclusory) analysis. The International Court asserted without
explanation that the "military necessity" exceptions in humanitarian law were inapplicable. 171
It curtly announced that Article 51 of the Charter had "no relevance" to the case. It characterized
the case as different from those described in the 2001 Security Council terrorism resolutions
because the terror attacks originated within occupied territory, but it did not explain why that
difference matters. It found that the fence violated the right of self-determination without fully
explaining how. By contrast, the Israeli Court spent several paragraphs developing, in painstaking detail, a three-part test of "proportionality" that rivals the most intricate constructions
165

See Ben Lynfield, Erekat: May 4 Will Be a Normal Day, JM. POST, May 4, 1999, at 1.

166 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments ofAgreements

Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Sept. 4, 1999, Isr.-PLO, 38 ILM 1465 (1999).
167For a critique of the Court's use of human rights law in the Wall advisory opinion, see Michael J. Dennis,
Application of Human Rights Treaties in Times ofArmed Conflict, 99 AJIL 119 (2005) (in this Agora).
...
Interim Agreement, supra note 154, Art. XXXI(7).
169 Declaration of Principles, supra note 154, Art. V(3).
170See, e.g., Dennis Ross, U.S. special Middle East coordinator, Note for the Record (Jan. 15, 1997), 36 ILM
665 (1997), reprintedin WATSON, supra note 151, at 375 (summarizing each side's major responsibilities under
the accords).
17 For a critique of this and other aspects of the Court's treatment of humanitarian law, see David Kretzmer,
The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 99 AJIL 88 (2005) (in this Agora).
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of American constitutional law. Intricacy is not always a good thing, but at least the analysis was
full-bodied enough to give the reader a thorough understanding of the Israeli Court's reasoning.
Likewise, the Israeli Court was much more careful about finding facts and applying law to those
facts. It engaged in a careful, detailed, case-by-case analysis of a number of segments of the wall
involving lengths of about five to ten kilometers each. It frankly weighed security concerns
against humanitarian ones, and more often than not found that insufficient attention had been
paid to the humanitarian concerns. By contrast, the International Court had little to say about
facts relating to security and terrorism. Obviously, this silence resulted partly from Israel's decision not to participate on the merits. But even without active Israeli participation, it is difficult
to believe that the Court could not have considered the security considerations in more detail
simply on the basis of information available in the public domain. For example, a lively debate
has taken place in public fora in Israel on whether the wall has in fact saved lives. Commentators
and the Israeli government have published various statistics comparing prefence deaths with
postfence deaths. 17 2 But the ICJ's opinion contained no argument or counterargument on these
factual questions.
These differences in methodology are not all attributable to the difference between the procedural postures of the two cases or the difference between an international and a domestic court.
The differences suggest a deeper difference in the two courts' conceptions of theirjudicial role.
The Israeli Supreme Court's jurisprudence is not just restrained-too restrained at times, as
when it avoids questions relating to the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention-but
also eminently pragmatic. In Beit Sourik, the Court issued an opinion that can be understood
and implemented by the military personnel responsible for the route of the fence, and that can
be accommodated politically by the Israeli politicians responsible for authorizing and funding
it. The decision is a reasonable mix of the retrospective (finding past and present violations of
law) and the prospective (fashioning practical relief to cure those violations).
By contrast, the decision of the International Court is not simply expansive and sweeping;
it is primarily retrospective and relatively unconcerned with practical implementation. The great
bulk of the opinion is given over to finding past and present violations of law. Those sections
devoted to prospective implementation have the virtue of simplicity-they merely instruct Israel
to tear down the entire wall-but they are not likely to influence Israeli (or American) decision
making. Perhaps no decision of the ICJ would have commanded respect in Israel; but it is at least
worth asking whether the Court might have achieved more had it engaged in a detailed, factbased inquiry into whether particular segments of the wall could or could not be justified on
security grounds. The International Court's decision was studied, after all, not just by lawyers
in the Israeli government, but also by lawyers in the government of Israel's most important ally,
the United States. If the ICJ had hoped to encourage the United States to press for modification
of the most troubling segments of the fence, the Court missed an opportunity to provide guidance on where to begin.
IV. CONCLUSION

Where, then, do these decisions leave the wall, and, more broadly, the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute? Obviously, the decision of the International Court is nonbinding, whereas Israel has
said it will abide by the decisions of its own courts. Thus, in the short run the likely result is some
relocation of segments of the wall but no cessation of construction. Interestingly, the Israeli
Supreme Court did instruct the government to "assess" the International Court's decision after
it came down. 7 3At about the same time, Israeli attorney general Menachem Mazuz warned that
the ICJ opinion might lead to international sanctions against Israel and that it "could gradually
'72
See, e.g., Matthew Gutman, 'In the Last Five Months, We've Had Zero Attacks,'JM. POST, June 2, 2004, at 1.
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have an effect on rulings by Israeli courts about the administration of military authority in the
territories and about the building of the fence." |7
The broader implications, of course, are more difficult to predict. Themost likely conclusion
is that the fence will make it harder to reach a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. It adds
yet one more "permanent status" issue to an already long list of intractable matters. Israel
hopes that the wall will decrease terrorism, and that a less violent atmosphere might actually
be more conducive to peace. It is too early to assess whether the barrier has actually achieved
its goal of deterring terrorism, if only because it has not yet been completed, although it does
appear that terrorist attacks have subsided somewhat over the past year. But even if thewall
does succeed in this aim, it will also have enraged a substantial segment of the Palestinian population, deprived thousands of farmers of access to land, and fostered still more distrust between Israelis and Palestinians. The best that can be hoped for is that this anger can be curbed
through a generous program of compensation in kind, or at least in money, and that mutual
trust can be rebuilt over a period of years and decades.
Will the "security fence" ever come down? Israel insists it is temporary, and that it will disappear once terror disappears. But terrorism will not entirely disappear, certainly not in our lifetimes. Nor is it likely that the fence will disappear. In fact, the wall is a sort of self-fulfilling
prophecy. The more successful it is in suppressing terror, the more likely it is to become permanent. And if terror continues, then the natural impulse will be to improve the wall's defenses,
not to tear them down. Thus, the most likely result is that the fence will eventually demarcate
the Israeli side of a negotiated border between Israel and Palestine. The route of the wall will
change as part of the agreement to demarcate this border, but the wall itself will not disappear.
That prospect is, to say the least, depressing.
Still, there is cause for hope. The passing of Arafat and the emergence of a new set of Palestinian leaders may have brightened prospects for peace. The Bush administration now seems
more committed to an active role in pursuing a negotiated settlement. More fundamentally,
the impulses that drove the Oslo process have not disappeared: Israel has an interest in relieving
itself of the political, financial, and military burdens of occupation; and the Palestinians have
an interest in self-government and the benefits of statehood. Oslo will rise again, clad in new clothes
and endowed with a new name. Oslo is not dead; it merely sleeps. 175
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It is hardly surprising that the controversial advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice in the case concerning the Israeli security fence raised serious concerns in many quarters,
on multiple grounds. Most prominently, as some of the judges and numerous commentators
have noted, the restriction of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter to attacks by "states" is unwarranted on the basis of the text.' It is also, of course, illogical
in an era when the worldwide terrorist threats stem primarily from nonstate actors. Additionally,
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